<Article> Japanese Perceptions of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement (1934-39) by Vald FERRETTI
<Article> Japanese Perceptions of Anglo-Soviet
Rapprochement (1934-39)
著者（英） Vald FERRETTI
journal or
publication title
Tsukuba Review of Law and Political Science
volume 17
page range 306-418
year 1994-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00155794
J apanese Perceptions of Anglo-Soviet 
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V ALDO FERRETTI* 
The Teikoku Gaiko Rゐhinand the Kokusaku no Kijun， dated 7 
August， 1936(1) proverbialIy represented the moment when the influ縄
問 ceof the military class on ]apanese foreign policy attained one of 
its utmost successes by including in the diplomatic guidelines of the 
Empire the principle that together with the United States and Russia， 
England was to be considered a possible enemy(Z). ln fact the targets 
of the Army and the Navy were different. While the former insisted 
on the danger and later on the destiny of clashing with the Soviet 
Union， the latter was stressing the principle of peaceful Southern 
expansion. One way say that the above disparity of views remained 
the same al through the decade leading to the Pacific War. ln 
parallel， the Army kept the idea that through the growth of her 
armaments， ]apan had to balance the powerfuI Far Eastern Soviet 
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The Navy， on the other hand， specially since 1934， was Army. 
replying that in order to make safe Japanese positions in China， the 
Anglo-Saxon powers were to be detered from helping the nationalist 
government of N anking. 
Therefore admirals were pleading for increased naval armaments 
aiming to check that sort of threat. 
One tiny aspect of this global issue， which has not been given much 
attentions by historians， iswhether Japanese leaders ever foresaw the 
chance that England and the Soviet Union might join against the 
Rising Sun or， more technically， whether they feared that both 
powers could formally ally for the purpose of restraining it. Lack of 
systematic research is easy to rationalize， given that， inEurope too， 
any attempt to reach an entente between London and Moscow ended 
in failure during the 1930's， while Far Eastern questions were hardly 
touched on during diplomatic negotiations conducted in different 
mo訂lents.
This is not to deny that in some moments the relations between 
both powers looked as if they could reach more political and military 
On the eve of the Czech and Polish crisis of 1938-9 collaboration. 
English and French officials wondered whether possible agreements 
with Russia were to incIude elements relating to the Far East. 
Although that point was never actually raised in the conversations 
?
?
?????
with tha USSR， the idea was sustained by the French Ambassador in 
Moscow in May， 1938， by his British colleague in the following 
February and later by the Chiefs of the Far Eastern and of the 
In spite of 
different attitude of the French， their suggestions were dropped at 
Central Departments of the Foreign Office in London. 
higher levels(3)， but it is worth nothing that the matter had been taken 
Even before 1938 however， symptoms into serious consideration. 
appeared， which could lead observers to think that the United 
Kingdom policies of support for the League of Nations and disarma-
ment were indirectly prompting Russian naval expansion in order to 
deter Japan's advance toward China and the Southern seas. 
As a British diplomat minuted， the superiority of Soviet land 
forces deflected J apanese aggressiveness southwards by imperiling 
British interests in China but the construction of a Russian fleet， 
following outspoken Soviet intentions and declarations， could engage 
the Rising Sun in an exhausting competition or permanently keep her 
In this connection， England， on negotiating navy in home waters(4). 
the Russian adhesion top the London Treaty on N aval Disarmament 
of 25-3“1936， accepted a formula which did not grant the USSR 
Such a precedent unrestrained right of construction in East Asia. 
could be exploited by Germany in order to reject or sabotage the 
treaty but Moscow was allowed to make a reservation in the same 
Moreover the latter added a unilateral declaration that she sense. 
would not introduce a'rmaments beyond the disarmament limits 
unless until Japan did it the first(的.
That was basically a compromise between the Soviet aim to ?
?
?????obtain in East Asia a fleet even stronger than in Europe and the 
British who hoped to draw Tokyo in the disarmament again(6). When 
ratification ensued however， inNovember 1937， Soviet naval projects 
and buildings attracted the attention of English officers and Russian 
increasing presence and armaments in the Far East seem to have 
influenced if not the result， atleast the contents of Anglo-French 
talks in the early stage of the Czechoslovakian crisis by fueling the 
idea on French side of trying extended cooperation with Moscow. 
The latter， inits turn， since the Marco Polo bridge episode， openly 
declared her readiness to intervene on China's side within the League 
of Nations principles and rulings(7). 1n other words， inthe period 
ranging from the Naval Conference of London of 1935--6 up to the 
Spring of 1939， a chance， although objectively weak， that an anti 
-] apanese understanding between Britain， France and Russia could 
be reached seems to have actually existed. 
On the course of ]apan's foreign policy however， perception that 
such a kind of alliance could take shape contributed at least partially 
to some important results. 1t is wel1 known that the most comprehen-
sive scheme aiming to solve the China problem and specially to brake 
America's intervention was the Tripartite Pact of 1940 with Germany 
and Itary. Moreover， we know that in the designs of Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka Yosuke it was just one stage of a process leading 
to the so-called Four Powers Bloc which was to include the USSR in 
addition to the Axis countries and ]apan. ]apanese research has 
revealed also that for the first time that project was expressed in a 
memorandum recently discovered among the papers of the Konoe 
family in Kyoto and probably drafted by Matsuoka himself in ]uly 
o 1939. At that time， negotiations for an alliance comprising England， 
France and Russia were being held in Moscow， while ]apan had not 
六 yetdecided-after more than one year of discussions--to make a 
、~
military pact with the two European Axis powers， atleast in the form 
they were requesting. In the circumstances of the German-Polish 
crisis in the Summer of 1939， Matsuoka stressed that if both combina-
tions were achieved， the United States too would join the Western 
bloc and a generaI war could foIIow. His suggestion was to dissuade 
the Soviet Union from aligning herself with Britain and France and 
attract her towards the Axis group. 1n this way， not only a generaI 
conflict would be avoided but aIso one of the main supporting pillars 
of Chiang Kai-shek's resistance to Japan would vanish， thus isolating 
Therefore， the four powers bloc scheme the other one， Britain 
helped as a finaI re弓ortagainst the fear that Anglo-Soviet alliance 
could be actuaIIy made and that Japan's joining the Nazi-Fascist 
group was not sufficient to neutralize the danger(叫ー
Concern for such a threat may have been unrealistic， but one 
should assume that it had ripened in the months if not years before， 
even if the British were basicaIIy against extending possible agree-
ments with USSR to the Far East. 
The most coherent and continuing thread which can be detected 
rests with the renovationist officiaIs of the Japanese Foreign Minis-
try and to a great extent with their most representative Ieader， 
The development of Shiratori's views has been Shiratori Toshio. 
divided by specialists in four stages with a central water吋ledon the 
eve of the Marco Polo bridge episode in July 1937. 
If before that data his apprehensions were basicaIIy for the Soviet ? ?
?
?????danger， thereafter he began to depict the United Kingdom as Japan' 
Later， as Japanese ambassador to Rome from s principaI enemy. 
1938 to 1939， he turned to be a warm advocate of "reinforcing" the 
Anti-Komintern Pact of 1936 by reshaping it as a politicaI and 
military alIiance inc1uding an automatic war c1ause addressed not 
According to only against Russia but England and France. as wel1. 
Tobe Ryaichi， the evolution of Shiratori's views of the Russian factor 
corresponded to that of the Japanese Army， which held the same 
position as he did on the German alliance question and should be seen 
However， an as an ideological cover for the latter's standing(9). 
Some days before additional reflexion will probably be useful. 
Matsuoka's memorandum of July 1939， Shiratori sent from Rome a 
few telegrams to the Foreign Minister Arita Hachira suggesting a 
He feared that the non-aggression treaty to the Soviet Union(1O) 
Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations could be successful and that， even 
if Japan joined the Axis group， ltaly and Germany would make 
efforts not to provoke or to appease the soviets. Hence J apan， inhis 
view， would risk facing alone a concentration of Russian power in 
N ot only in that crucial moment did Shiratori show he East Asia. 
attached much importance to the USSR but linked it also to the 
danger of alignment between Moscow and the democratic powers.. 
Far from thinking that seeing one of them as a possible enemy 
automatically meant appeasing or neutralizing the other one， the 
ambassador to Rome appeared to believe that concrete action was 
needed in order to impede that they join against Japan. If， since 1937， 
as Tobe claims， Shiratori thought that England had become Japan's 
main adversary， in1939 he was far from disregarding the Soviet 
threat within the frame of the diplomatic environment created by 
?
?
?????
One may wonder， however， when Shiratori had origi-war in China. 
A revealing tele-nally started to perceive such a gloomy shadow. 
gram had been sent by him from Stockholm， where he was serving as 
It had been inspired by the visit to 
London of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs， Maksim M. 
a minister， inJanuary 1936(1). 
Litvinov， who had been received by King Edward VIs and had met the 
military Ministers of England and France. The gist of his advise was 
that as a res11t of the Second Naval Conference on Naval Disarma. 
ment， abandoned by the J apanese delegation two weeks before the 
telegram， the British government had decided to prefer Russia to 
Japan. Shiratori concIuded that， inthe circl1mstances， the Japanese 
government should pay more attention than in the past "to the 
problems of El1rope and America". 
1n October 1935 the Soviet Union had entered tha League of 
Nations and later in 1936 Shiratori sl1pported the idea of an alliance 
with Germany against Russia(12) after negotiations of the first Anti 
-Kominfern Pact had started secretly in 1935 and while they were stil 
gomg on. 
1n other words， on the eve of the first clear steps taken by 
Litvinov's pro-Leagl1e of N ations diplomacy and its early fruits (sl1ch 
as the stil l1nofficial British decision to invite Rl1ssia to sign the 
Naval Treaty)(13)， Shiratori， who was afraid of the USSR， warned 
British policies versus Moscow had to be Tokyo that friendly 
restrained just before the above mentioned Anglo-Soviet negotia. 
tions were going to start. 
1n Tokyo， diplomats belonging to the renovationist faction (Kaku. ? ? ?
??
???
shinha) like Kurihara Tadashi and Matsl1miya Jl1n， although not 
always agreeing with Shiratori by any means， seem to have reasoned 
following the same pattern but in more alarming and concrete terms 
during the discussions over reinforcement of the Anti-Komintern 
The young officers of the 1st office of 
白 imushawrote down in the last months of the first Konoe govern町
Pact in 1938 and 1939. 
ment a memorandum probably intended for the premier(14) and in 
April 1939 reiterated the same view in one more "private opinion" 
addressed to the Foreign Minister Arita Hachirδduring the subse-
Both papers were close to the Army quent Hiranuma Cabinet(J5). 
standing and tried to demonstrate that in any case the alliance had to 
be concluded. Among other arguments there appeared considerations 
relevant to our topic. They remarked that Chekoslovakian events in 
Europe (the Munich conference had taken place in October 1938 and 
the Nazi coup in Prague followed suit in March 1939) were ac-
companied by negotiations of political entente between the Soviet 
Union and England ]ust when Soviet military forces in the Far East 
were growing stronger and stronger and border incidents followed at 
short intervals. The chance of Anglo-Soviet cooperation looked so 
strong as to lead them to stre田 thatif the German-]apanese alliance 
were not made the Axis powers could change al their policies and a 
great league of western countries would coalesce by ultimately 
driving ]apan out of the Asian continent and plunging her into 
domestic unrest and disorder. Behind their words the old ghost of a 
great coalition of al white powers seem to reappear but it is very 
interesting that its shape was taking the form of the Anglo-Soviet 
entente. 
Additionally in one of the young officer's documents it was stated 
??????
?
that England was trying to detach Italy from the Axis partners and 
they felt that Mussolini could reconcile differences with Britain， a 
perception probably influenced by the Anglo-Italian agr田mentof 16 
In their view it was opportune to 
counter such a trend by making the Tripartite bloc as compact as 
April 1938 or by its premises(16). 
possible， incIuding Italy in it and putting an end to J apanese hesita喝
tions. That would refrain Britain from an alIiance with th USSR and 
weaken the Franco-Soviet combination， thus putting out of danger 
Japanese positions in China. It seems naturaI to draw a line between 
Shiratori's telegram of January 1936， the memoranda of his followers 
The in 1938 and 1939 the ambassador's suggestions of July 1939. 
renovationists never lost of sight Russia as a menace， nor did they 
Hence from 1936 onwards they tended to forget the Soviet Army. 
Negotiations between London support the alliance with Germany. 
and Moscow， originated in 1936 by the naval disarmament and in 1938 
and 1939 by European events， led rightist diplomats to think that 
Russia through cooperation with the United Kingdom and France 
could neutralize the German threat and interfere more powerfully on 
Therefore they advocated a Iien as solid as the Chinese scene. 
possible with the Axis countries. By July 1939， Shiratori went beyond 
premises and reached the conclusion that an understanding between 
the two main rivals of Japan was so dangerous as to make necessary 
The last step was an offer of a non-aggression treaty to Russia. 
taken by Matsuoka who， inorder to face danger and to safe peace， 
The international situation must invented the four powers scheme. 
have looked so hopeless to him as to overlook the ideologically and ????????
racially rooted mistrust vis-a-vis Russia and the slavic peril， which 
got a few Gaimtωhδrenovationists not to support or to oppose the 
Tripartite Pact in 1940(17). 
The political force of these groups， however， was weak and the 
ultimate success of Matsuoka's view， atleast on Japan's side， leads us 
to suppose that some influential factor in policy making must have 
If attention to the problem of Anglo-Soviet paid the way for it町
rapprochement was sometimes paid by officials belonging to other 
factions in the Foreign Ministy， itwas not consistent， while nothing 
more can be basically said for the Army(18). 
It is reasonable to think instead that some role in this sense was 
played by the Imperial N avy whose men， specially if partisans of the 
former K，抑制加 orof the Nanshin groups， after the Manchurian 
lncident often met renovationist diplomats in sociaI occasions and 
working or study meetings(19). 
The idea that England could avaiI herself of the Soviet Far 
Eastern naval bases against Japan and be allowed to use them in case 
of war was hinted at by the Chief of the MiIitary Affairs Bureau， 
Yoshida Zengo， before the Privy Council on 7 November 1934 when 
the N avy demanded to denounce the Five Powers Treaty of 192(20). 
A proviso with analogous contents was included in the "Essential 
Points on National Strategy" drafted by the service in April1936 and 
later in the above mentioned Teikoku Gaiko H.δ'Shin of the following 
August(21). 
1n the meantime a few documents coming from the N aval Staff 
and from the Command of the Third fleet mantained that Britain 
could push other powers， among which the USSR， against J apan<2). 
To a large extent such arguments were probably ficticious as the 
???????
service high echelons then did not want a war with the United 
Kingdom but intended only to avoid that the Army seize upon most 
。fthe military budget on the pretext of a pending war with Russia. 
However， 011 the eve of discusssions about reinforcing the Anti 
Komintern Pact， stronger voices and arguments roughly similar to 
those of Gaim附加 renovationistsrang out. Both in 1938 and in 1939 
the Chief of the (provisory) Research Section of the Navy Ministry， 
Captain Takagi Sokichi， expressed the view that Italy had to be 
restrained from settling her attritions with Britain and that in case of 
war between Japan and Russia the United States and England would 
take Moscow's side(23). Moreover the service prefered not to see出e
Soviet Union as the only enemy considered as such in the allaince 
while it was against inserting in it any authomatic war clause. 
It was just for the case that Britain side with Russia in a possible 
defensive conflict between the latter and Japan that the Navy agreed 
to add the United Kingdom to the list of hipothetical enemies. Thus 
against the Foreign Ministry the service wanted the military alliance 
to be extended to ItaIy， which was at odds with England since the 
Ethiopian-Mediterranean crisis of 1935例.
After the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact of 23 August 1939 Takagi 
supported the project of the four powers bloc as he thought that 
escaping diplomatic isolation through a settlement with the Anglo 
-Saxon powers was difficult because of existing contrasts in China(25). 
According to him the risk of failing an approach in their direction and 
to have to face Russia at the same time had not to be run while he 
mantained that the end of the Soviet menace in the N orth would 
leave J apanese Southern expansion unrestrained. 
Perhaps his position made clear the background of previous Navy 
九_._ 
/、
concern for Anglo-Soviet cooperation， as it appeared in 1936 already = 
just when Southward expansion was formally requested by the 
admirals in the frame of the diplomatic guidelines of the Empire. 
Shall one argue that since the London conference of 1935山6up to the 
start of war in Europe， Navy men stimulated or gave strength to the 
fears of Gaimusho Kakushinha officials that Polish or Chekoslova司
kian events could lead to an alliance active in the Far East also， 
among England， the Soviet Union and France? We can but wish that 
the research of Japanese scholars answer this question in futur・e.
酌1oreovera tentative conclusion is that any sort of peaceful advance， 
peaceful or armed， would have become more difficult had Anglo 
For that reason at least， the Impe--Soviet cooperation come about. 
rial Navy was led to take that threat into account by striving to 
offset it before 1936 and by approving the four powers bloc strategy 
after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. 
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